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“A MEMORY WITHIN CHANGE 
ITSELF.” BERGSON AND 




When we consider our experience from a broad perspective — taking 
into account our cognitive, emotional, and evaluative attitudes — it is 
evident that in many cases memory does not possess a merely causal role 
in relation to experiences that have temporal contents. At least some of 
these aspects of experience are constitutively related to memory. That is, 
they would not be the kind of experiences they in fact are if memory did 
not figure in them.1 Our experiences of nostalgia, of grief, our reflections 
on the way time has been passing faster as we have been growing older, 
our appreciation of the progress we’ve been making — all of these cases 
arguably include the experienced recollection of past events and are thus 
not only causally related to past experiences. A constitutive relation to 
memory also seems to obtain in the case of our more banal reflections on 
temporal order, for example when I try to remember whether I watered my 
plants yesterday, or the day before.
1. There are, broadly, two ways in which memory can constitutively figure in experience: 
(i) remembered things or events can be taken to be included in the contents of current 
experiences; (ii) the remembered things or events can be (further) taken to be experienced 
as memories. Marking a difference between the two is crucial in the context of the 
“modified” memory theory of change perception (James 1890; Stout 1930; Husserl 
1991; O’Shaughnessy 2000; Phillips 2010; 2018), which I explore below.
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My focus here, however, is on a much more tightly circumscribed topic 
— the relation between memory and our non-inferential experience of 
change and motion.2 And my central claim will be that Bergson’s views 
on this relation, which have not been discussed in significant detail in the 
literature, can shed new light upon recent debate on the topic.3 I approach 
this in three steps. First, I examine the “memory theory” of non-inferential 
temporal experience in its two main forms — a “traditional” version and a 
“modified account” — situating Bergson’s views vis-à-vis this distinction. 
Second, I explore a contemporary defence of the memory theory (Phillips 
2010; 2018) and underline a limitation in this account. Finally, I focus on 
a feature of Bergson’s reflections on memory and temporal experience that 
can potentially address this limitation. 
I. The Memory Theory: Tradition and Modification
Various thinkers have defended a memory theory of immediate temporal 
experience, on which memory is taken to be not only causally related to 
but also partially constitutive of our experience of change. An influential 
2. The term “non-inferential experience,” frequently qualified as “immediate experience,” 
is meant to mark out the character of perceptual experience as distinct from reasoning 
expressed in personal-level judgments or inferences. See Chisholm (1957, 158-159) for 
highly influential discussion of non-inferential experience in this sense. Le Poidevin has 
described non-inferential temporal experience as follows: “We are indirectly aware of the 
passage of time when we reflect on our memories, which present the world as it was, and 
so a contrast with how things are now. But much more immediately than this is seeing the 
second hand move around the clock or hearing a succession of notes in a piece of music, 
or feeling a raindrop run down your neck. There is nothing inferential, it seems, about the 
perception of change and motion: it is simply given in experience” (Le Poidevin 2007, 87).
3. Bergson’s views on the faculty of memory and its role in experience broadly construed 
have been, by contrast, the object of sustained study which has also extended beyond 
Bergson scholarship. For all the fact that Bergson’s thought as a whole was not widely 
discussed after the first decades of the previous century, in the Anglophone context 
in particular, Bergson’s reflections on the faculty of memory have exerted a significant 
influence upon the understanding of memory and its structure in 20th-century philosophy 
and psychology. This holds true, in particular, for the distinction between two types of 
memory — “habit memory” and “image memory” — advanced in Matter and Memory 
(Bergson 1988, 79-90). Key instances of this influence include Russell’s chapter on 
memory in Analysis of Mind (Russell 1921, 166), and the distinction between “memory 
systems” in the works of two of the most prominent memory researchers in recent decades 
(Tulving 1986, 307; Shachter 1996, 165, 169-170; see also Tulving and Shachter 1994, 
6, 8). For recent accounts of Bergson’s views on memory, see Ricoeur (2000, 21-30; 
50-53; 427-440); François (2008, 31-36); Ansell-Pearson (2018, Ch 4); Perri (2017); 
Sinclair (2019, Ch 4).
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source for the position is Reid’s view. According to Reid, sense perception 
is limited to the present moment in a “strict” sense:
[I]f we speak strictly and philosophically, no kind of succession can be an object 
either of the senses, or of consciousness; because the operations of both are 
confined to the present point of time, and there can be no succession in a point 
of time (Reid 1785, 325-326).
Reid is working with an Augustinian idea of the present as having no 
temporal extension whatsoever, an “interval with no duration” (Augustine 
2008, 232) or an “indivisible point of time, which divides the future 
from the past” (Reid 1785, 326). And since sense perception is limited 
to the present, we cannot be said to perceive succession by sense. Now, 
and here Reid also follows Augustine, we do often speak as if the present 
has temporal extension. We say that we see motion (Reid 1785, 326), and 
we consider the present as varying according to the particular context of 
discussion — we speak of the present hour, year, or century (Reid 1785, 
326; Augustine 2008, 231-232).4 This kind of inaccuracy, Reid notes, is 
perfectly legitimate in “common life” (Reid 1785, 326). Philosophers, 
however, should insist on a “strict” meaning of the expression “the present 
moment.” This first point leads to the positive aspect of Reid’s argument 
concerning the origin of our idea of succession:
[I]t is only by the aid of memory that we discern motion, or any succession 
whatsoever: we see the present place of the body; we remember the successive 
advance it made to that place: the first can then only give us a conception of 
motion, when joined to the last (Reid 1785, 327).
We do in fact experience temporal features, despite the fact that this 
awareness is not strictly perceptual. Reid is here offering a bare-bones 
version of the traditional memory theory. On the view, our awareness of 
change essentially depends on memory, it is memorial awareness.5
4. Augustine, unlike Reid, does not consider sense perception to be confined to the 
present, and does not make the Reidian distinction between memory and perception 
presented below (e.g., Augustine 2008, 242-243).
5. It might be suggested that Reid’s account is of the way we acquire a “conception” 
(Reid 1785, 327), rather than an experience, of motion. Reid, however, is also arguably 
aiming for an account of the way we are made aware, “discern” (1785, 327) or “observe” 
(1785, 326) change. For relevant discussion, see Falkenstein (2017, 48-49). Additional 
important instances of the traditional memory theory can be found in Brentano’s lectures 
on the consciousness of time, as described by Husserl (1991, 13-14), and Mellor’s (1998, 
122-123) explanation of our short-term awareness of time. Mellor’s focus in the relevant 
passage, however, is solely on the directionality of temporal experience.
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The Reidian account faces numerous challenges. Here’s a first. Take the 
opening notes of Bach’s Cello Suite #1 in G Major: G-D-B
FIGURE 1. Opening notes of Bach’s Cello Suite #1
The form of the view as presented by Reid above needs to be refined in 
order to seem at least initially plausible. We would need, for example, to 
be able to account for a structure in our awareness of change (in memory) 
that maps onto the progression of the notes. When we experience the first 
B, it wouldn’t be enough to say that we remember G and D together with 
the sense perception of B, which would be compatible with D having been 
heard before the G, and with the G having been heard two months ago 
(see Dainton 2006/2000, 124). We would want to say that we remember 
having just heard D with a short-term memory of G and having previously 
heard G when the D was played. Without temporal distance and order as 
part of the traditional memory theory, it is wildly implausible.
It could perhaps be claimed that Reid’s view already includes something 
like the idea of temporal distance and order, when he writes (in relation 
to the spatial case) of remembering the “successive advance [the object] 
made to [its present] place.” Even with the idea of distance and order in 
place, however, the view seems to face an insurmountable challenge. On 
the traditional memory theory, remembering what occurred a year ago and 
what happened two seconds ago involves experiences of the same kind. 
Likewise, noticing that something changed in relation to the way it was a 
minute ago, and being aware of a note played half a second ago on the cello 
involves the same type of awareness. This kind of identity lies in conflict 
with what is widely taken to be a striking experiential difference between 
perceiving change and noticing that something has changed, a difference 
influentially noted by Broad (1923, 351) and Russell (Russell 1927, 280-
281).6 Watching a shooting star, for example, is different than noticing 
that the moon has changed its position. This kind of difference does not 
6. Broad frames this as a “notorious fact” (Broad 1923, 351) rather than a particularly 
original insight. As we shall see below, the difference Broad and Russell are bringing out 
here can be accommodated by accounts which predate their work, e.g., James’ (1890) and 
“A Memory within Change Itself.”… 17
seem to amount to one between being aware that change has taken place 
over one minute, say, rather than one second, a type of difference that can 
be accommodated within the traditional proposal. The suggestion is rather 
that are aware of change in the two cases in a different way.7
A way to respond to this challenge is available from conceptual resources 
supplied by a non-traditional form of the memory theory.8 On such 
a view, the perception of change is explained by the contribution of a 
particular type of memory, distinguished from recollection or episodic 
memory. The locus classicus of the position is James’ chapter on memory 
from The Principles of Psychology. The type of memory associated with the 
Bergson’s (1988). See also Phillips (2018, 289) for discussion of this objection as lethal 
for the traditional memory theory.
7. Another prima facie powerful argument against the memory theory, which can also be 
levelled against the “modified” form of the view presented below, has been discussed by 
Dainton (2006/2000, 126-7; 2010/2001, 1056) and Tye (2003, 87-88). If, for example, 
we are considering the experience of a bird’s movement through positions L1, L1, L3 in 
times t1, t2, t3, the memory theory would account for this as an experience of the bird 
in L1 (at t1); then in L2 (at t2) together with a short-term memory of the bird in L1 (at 
t1); and then of its position L3 (at t3), together with short-term memories of its location 
L1 (at t1) and L2 (at t2). This might seem problematic, because we experience not only 
phases of the movement or change, but also the phases as succeeding one another. We 
experience the bird in L2 (at t2), as following upon it being in location L1 (at t1). How 
can the memory theory account for this experience of succession? By hypothesis, we 
cannot remember what we have not perceived, but it is in part due to memory that we 
are meant to be supplied with an experience of succession. It seems that the memory 
account has to presuppose what it is attempting to explain. As Phillips (2018, 288-289) 
notes, however, this is not necessarily the case. The memory theory can be seen as offering 
an account of succession, in that it explains the experience of succession as involving the 
connection of a short-term memory with the present precept. This, I take it, requires us 
to attribute to memory the capacity to make a positive contribution within experience, 
namely in supplying the connection implied in succession. But considering memory as 
productive in this sense does not seem to present a significant obstacle. In describing 
Phillips’ response, I’ve used “connection” instead of Phillips’ “conjunction.” Conjunction 
is symmetrical, and succession strikingly isn’t.
8. Another way for a theory of temporal experience to accommodate this difference is to 
understand it as a difference between memory and perception. Memory would supply our 
experience of noticing that change has occurred, while perception endowed with noticeable 
temporal extent is what gives us the experience of perceiving change. This would mean 
opting out of a memory theory altogether. See my discussion further below in this section, 
for a response on the part of this kind of proposal to Phillips’ modified memory theory.
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immediate perception of change is termed, in James’ account, “primary” 
or “elementary”:9
[W]hat elementary memory makes us aware of is the just past. The objects we feel 
in this directly intuited past differ from properly recollected objects. An object 
which is recollected, in the proper sense of that term, is one which has been 
absent from consciousness altogether, and now revives anew. It is brought back, 
recalled, fished up, so to speak, from a reservoir in which, with countless other 
objects, it lay buried and lost from view. But an object of primary memory is not 
thus brought back; it never was lost; its date was never cut off in consciousness 
from that of the immediately present moment. In fact, it comes to us as belonging 
to the rearward portion of the present space of time, and not to the genuine past 
(James 1890, 646-647).
James is here articulating the idea setting apart what can be called the 
modified memory theory (following Phillips 2010; 2018 and Hoerl 
2009) from the traditional account. Our perception of change, on this 
version of the view, is accounted for by the constitutive contribution of 
memory, in that temporal perception would not be what it is were it not 
for the involvement of primary memory. This involvement, however, is not 
susceptible to the challenge expressed by Broad and Russell. The modified 
view allows us to bring out a difference in kind between perceiving change 
(e.g., watching a shooting star) and noticing that change happened (e.g., 
noticing the moon has moved). Direct, or immediate, perception of 
change is due to the preservation of the perceived which is characteristic of 
memory, but this is a preservation of an object which “was never cut off in 
consciousness from […] the immediately present moment.”10
The relation of Bergson’s thought to the development of the memory 
theory has not been examined in significant detail.11 In Time and Free Will, 
Bergson hints that memory plays an essential role in our perception of 
change, when he explains the experience of temporal properties as due to 
the “synthesis carried out by our consciousness between the actual positions 
and what our memory calls the former positions [la synthèse opérée par 
notre conscience entre la position actuelle et ce que notre mémoire appelle les 
positions antérieures]” (Bergson 1910, 124). But this is not decisive. The 
work does not explore the relations between perception and memory, so it 
9. The type of memory described here has also been called “retention,” following Husserl 
(1991), although retention theorists frequently resist calling it “memory.”
10. The modified memory theory is defended, for example, in Stout (1930), Husserl 
(1991), O’Shaughnessy (2000), and recently in Phillips (2010; 2018). 
11. Though see a number of remarks in Sinclair’s Bergson (2019, 47-48, 93), and a brief 
related note in Perri (2017, 510-511).
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does not seem to be possible to ascertain whether the view is a “traditional” 
or “modified” version of the account. From 1896’s Matter and Memory, 
however, we can see Bergson presenting an account of change perception 
which appeals to memory, and which involves distinguishing this kind of 
memory from recollective or “secondary” memory:
However brief we suppose our perception to be, it always occupies a certain 
duration, and involves, consequently, an effort of memory which prolongs, one 
into another, a plurality of moments […] Memory in […] two forms, covering 
as it does with a cloak of recollections a core of immediate perception, and 
also contracting a number of external moments into a single internal moment, 
constitutes the principal share of individual consciousness in perception, the 
subjective side of the knowledge of things (Bergson 1988, 34).
The relevant point in this passage is the distinction Bergson makes between 
(i)  recollection and (ii)  a memory which preserves phases forming the 
continuity characteristic of durée in a “single internal moment,” and in that 
sense seems to be part and parcel of immediate perception itself.12 Memory 
is constitutive of the “concrete present” — the present as experienced — 
quite a different thing than what one might suppose when taking up a 
“strict” definition of the present as an “indivisible limit which divides the 
past from the future” (Bergson 1988, 150). 
The relation of durée to memory, and the difference between the two 
types of memory is made further explicit in a passage from Duration and 
Simultaneity’s third chapter (“Concerning the Nature of Time”), in which 
Bergson characterises the continuity of immediate experience:
What is this continuity? That of a flow or passage […] and this transition, all 
that is naturally experienced, is duration itself. It is memory, but not personal 
memory, external to what it retains, distinct from a past whose preservation it 
assures; it is a memory within change itself, a memory that prolongs the before 
into the after (Bergson 1965, 44).
Two things can be underlined here. First, Bergson explicitly identifies durée 
with memory, which rules out taking memory to possess only a causal 
role with regards to the experience of change.13 Secondly, Bergson further 
distinguishes between the type of memory implied in the continuity of 
experience, a “memory within change itself ” (James’ primary memory, 
which is not “cut off in consciousness [from] the immediately present 
12. This distinction is noted by Sinclair (2019, 93) and Perri (2017, 510-511).
13. By the claim that durée “is” memory, I take Bergson to be arguing that memory 
plays an essential role in durée. There is perhaps a certain looseness in the claim regarding 
identity. See also fn. 20.
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moment”), from “personal memory”14 which is “external to what it retains” 
(James’ secondary memory, which “has been absent from consciousness 
[…] and now revives anew”).
We can, then, secure an understanding of Bergson’s position as taking up 
the idea central to the modified memory theory: memory of a specific kind, 
a memory “within change itself,” plays a constitutive role in immediate 
temporal experience.15
II. The Preservation of Past Psychological Success: Phillips’ Defence of 
the Modified Memory Theory
Contemporary work on temporal experience does not frequently appeal 
to the memory theory. Accounts of the non-inferential experience of 
time typically fall under one of three models: cinematic, retentional, 
or extensional. The cinematic view, on which perception is limited to 
instantaneous “snapshots,” relies rather straightforwardly on the memory 
theory in its traditional form. A cinematic theorist seems to need recourse 
to memory in order to explain our experiential grasp of temporal properties. 
But the cinematic model has been largely rejected during the past century 
(though see Chuard 2011; 2017 for a recent defence of the view).
Both the retentional and extensional models allow for the immediate 
perception of temporal properties, while differing with regards to the 
relation they describe as obtaining between temporal experience and 
its content. On the retentional view, temporal properties (succession, 
14. Bergson’s recently published Collège de France course on memory, delivered between 
the years 1903-1904, includes extended reflections on the notion of “personal” memory 
(Bergson 2018, 116, 119ff.).
15. One can also find frequent discussion of the relation between memory and temporal 
experience in the period between his first two works and 1922’s Duration and Simultaneity. 
“Introduction to Metaphysics” (1903), for example, includes an emphatic endorsement 
of the constitutive role of memory in durée: “There is no mood, however, no matter 
how simple, which does not change at every instant, since there is no consciousness 
without memory, no continuation of a state without the addition, to the present feeling, 
of the memory of past moments. That is what duration consists of. Inner duration is 
the continuous life of a memory which prolongs the past into the present, whether the 
present distinctly contains the ever-growing image of the past, or whether, by its continual 
changing of quality, it attests rather the increasingly heavy burden dragged along behind 
one the older one grows” (Bergson 1946, 211). Memory is described here by Bergson as 
implicated both in non-inferential, or immediate, temporal experience as well as in the 
“long term” unity of experience. Further passages in which Bergson notes the relation 
between memory and durée include Bergson (2019, 43, 55, 63 and 1911, 4, 20).
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order, duration) are considered as contents of instantaneous, or quasi-
instantaneous experiences. The model is sometimes understood as 
involving the application of a general lesson concerning representation to 
the case of temporal experience: just as we do not take our experience of 
a red flower, for example, to be itself red, our experience of time need not 
be taken to possess (significant) temporal structure. The representational 
vehicle (in this case, the experience representing temporal properties) need 
not be understood as possessing the structure of its contents (the temporal 
properties).16 The extensional model, by contrast, involves identifying an 
explanatory connection between the experience of time and its contents. 
On this view, our experience of temporal properties itself unfolds, or 
progresses in time. Our experience of temporal properties is explained by 
the temporal extension of experience.17 Versions of both the retentional and 
the extensional theories, the two competing models of temporal experience 
in contemporary literature, do not typically employ the memory theory. 
One can find, for example, explicit criticism of the memory theory in Lee’s 
(2014) retentional model,18 as well as in Dainton (2006/2000) and Hoerl’s 
extensional accounts of temporal experience (Hoerl 2009). 
In recent work, Phillips has defended a form of the memory theory 
which he takes to apply to both the retentional and extensional models 
(Phillips 2010; 2018). A broad aim of his paper involves suggesting that 
the distinction between the models of temporal experience does not 
hinge on whether they appeal to the memory theory. Seeing that all the 
models might well involve attributing to memory a constitutive role in 
change perception would allow us, according to Phillips, to focus on the 
central issue with regards to which the views diverge: the relation between 
temporal experience and the temporal profile of experience itself. More 
specifically, on the question of whether temporal experience itself unfolds 
16. See Tye (2003), Grush (2005; 2007; 2016), and Lee (2014) for recent versions of the 
retentional model. Earlier variants of the view can be found in James (1890) and Husserl (1991).
17. See Dainton (2006/2000; 2008; 2014; 2016), Phillips (2010; 2018), Hoerl (2009; 
2013; 2017), and Soteriou (2010; 2013) for recent extensional accounts of temporal 
experience. Bergson is arguably a proponent of the approach, and another early variant of 
the position can also be found in Stern (2005).
18. Lee’s (2014) view is a version on the retentional model, in that on his account our 
experience of change is the content of quasi-instantaneous states, and there is thus no 
explanatory relation between the structure of temporal experience and its content. Lee 
explicitly denies, however, a constitutive role for memory (including “retention” memory, 
as described by Husserl) in change perception. In light of this rejection, Lee terms his 
position the “atomic view” of temporal experience.
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in time (Phillips 2018, 294-295). I will return to this suggestion in the 
conclusion of this paper.
Phillips pursues this goal by specifying the claims made within the memory 
theory in its modified form and showing that the theory can be understood 
as applicable to an understanding of temporal experience on the retentional 
view — contra Lee’s rejection of the memory theory (Lee 2014) — as well 
as the extensional view — as defended by Dainton (2006/2000). Phillips’ 
argument starts from appreciating that the distinguishing feature of all 
forms of memory is a preservation of “cognitive contact” with the past, 
or the continuation of past psychological success.19 Episodic memory, 
James’ “secondary” memory, involves preservation of past acquaintance 
with things or events; semantic memory involves the preservation of 
past knowledge (Phillips 2010, 194; 2018, 291). Primary, or elementary, 
memory can be seen as involving the continuation of past psychological 
success by allowing us to have experiences of things succeeding one another. 
If we are considering the succession of notes do to re, for example:
[H]earing re involves primary memory insofar as it involves hearing re in a 
particular way, namely as succeeding from do. This modification of one’s manner 
of awareness plausibly counts as a form in which psychological success (namely 
awareness of do) can be preserved (Phillips 2018, 291).
Crucially, the idea of preservation of past psychological success in primary 
memory does not depend on the presentation of preceding parts or phases 
of a succession as past — the modified form of the memory theory does 
not involve tensed experiences of the phases in succession (Phillips 2018, 
290-291). Successive phases can be considered as parts of one unified, 
albeit complex, perceptual experience of change. In that way, the modified 
memory theory can hold on to the distinction between noticing that 
change happened — which would include tensed experiences — and the 
immediate perception of change. The latter involves the preservation of 
past success in a memory “internal to change,” experiences which are not 
retrieved since they have never been absent. 
This construal of the memory theory in its modified form, in line with the 
ideas from James and Bergson presented above, allows Phillips to argue 
that both the retentional and extensional accounts can be understood as 
appealing to memory (Phillips 2018, 289-294). The idea of the preservation 
of past psychological success, according to Phillips, is implied in the very 
idea of an experience of succession, regardless of the relation a theory of 
19. Phillips here draws upon Martin’s (2001) account of episodic memory. 
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temporal experience takes to obtain between the content of temporal 
experience and its structure. That is, regardless of whether experiences of 
succession are themselves successive. Both the retentional and extensional 
approaches assert that we immediately experience succession, and 
experiencing succession involves the preservation of past psychological 
success — and hence memory.
One may wonder, however, whether the turn to memory has been 
decisively motivated in the context of Phillips’ argument. The preservation 
of past psychological success is meant to explain our experience of temporal 
properties, but it has seemed to a number of theorists that the appeal to 
memory in this context is unnecessary. Hoerl, for example, sketches out an 
alternative on which succession simply falls under the scope of a temporally 
extended experience (Hoerl 2009, 8), which need not involve any appeal to 
memory. The modified memory theory, according to Hoerl, does not seem 
to describe a real contact with the past, but only a “proxy for that contact” 
(Hoerl 2009, 4). As I understand Hoerl’s point, it is that when we look 
at what the memory theory is meant to account for — the experience of 
succession — perception itself already possess all the necessary resources.
Dainton also expresses a similar thought, recently noting with regards to 
the involvement of memory in Bergson’s durée that “a case can be made 
[…] for holding that in these contexts [i.e., the contexts in which Bergson 
examines the relation of durée to memory] Bergson’s ‘memory’ is simply the 
unifying relation which connects the earlier and later phases into a single 
episode of durée” (Dainton 2017, 104). On Dainton’s view of temporal 
experience, the experiential unifying relation which binds together phases 
of change into a single experience — “co-consciousness” — does not 
involve memory of any kind (Dainton 2006/2000, 126-127; 2010/2001, 
105-106). An analogous line of thought comes up in Lee (2014), who takes 
it that a single state, devoid of any relation to memory, can satisfactorily be 
considered as having succession as its content. There is no work to be done 
by memory in the immediate apprehension of succession.
It is difficult to make out who has the upper hand in this debate. Given that 
what we are accounting for is the experience of succession, there does not 
seem to be a decisive reason either in favour, or against, the memory theory 
of change in its modified form. Phillips’ version of the view, in line with 
the aforementioned points mentioned in relation to James and Bergson, 
is coherent, and successful in escaping the challenge articulated in Broad’s 
work. There is a measure of intuitive appeal to the idea of a preservation of 
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past psychological success as required for an account of change perception, 
but it seems that the modification of awareness involved in experiencing 
succession can just as well be thought (as suggested by Hoerl, Dainton, and 
Lee) to be inherent to temporal experience itself, as distinct from memory.
III. The Dynamic Memory Theory 
Bergson, as noted above, presents a view in accordance with the idea at the 
heart of the modified memory theory. As in James’ and Phillips’ accounts, 
on Bergson’s view a type of memory distinct from recollection is implied 
in our non-inferential experience of change. Memory prolongs the “before 
into the after” (Bergson 1965, 44) and is thus essential to our experience of 
succession. As I noted with regards to Phillips’ proposal, this idea in itself 
does not seem to decisively carve out an explanatory niche for the memory 
theory. What I would like to suggest, at this stage, is that we can find in 
Bergson an additional claim that could make the appeal to memory more 
persuasive. The claim is that our awareness of change does not only involve 
the preservation of past psychological success; it involves the preservation 
of that which is “receding” within the present of our perception, the 
prolongation of that which is no longer in what is.
According to Bergson, durée is the “continuous life of a memory which 
prolongs the past into the present” (Bergson 1946, 211). In this sense, 
the role of (primary) memory in immediate temporal experience involves 
the preservation of the past, the “building up” of states in the course of 
changes and movements. My experience of the succession of the notes 
G-D-B in the opening of Bach’s Cello Suite #1, for example, is in this sense 
due to memory. So far, we are in the realm of the modified memory theory 
as presented by James (1890), and as recently defended in Phillips (2018). 
But the awareness of the change also involves memory because these notes 
recede into the past as they are perceived; or rather, as Bergson might have 
preferred, a new present is arising at each stage of the succession, constantly 
replacing the past moments. This is particularly evident in a passage from 
Duration and Simultaneity:
[I]t is impossible to distinguish between the duration, however short it may be, 
that separates two instances and a memory that connects them,20 because duration 
20. There is a certain looseness to the expression “impossible to distinguish between” 
here (as also noted in fn. 13 with regards to the passage from Bergson 1965, 44). I take to 
mean that it is impossible for durée to be a feature of experience without memory being 
involved.
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is essentially a continuation of what no longer exists into what does exist. This is real 
time, perceived and lived (Bergson 1965, 49; italics mine). 
The idea, I think, is experientially compelling, even if we seldom pause to 
appreciate it or its significance. When we hear the note B in the phrase 
G-D-B of the cello suite phrase, for example, there is a sense in which the 
G is no longer, though it is still present, or preserved, in our consciousness. 
Jumping into a cool lake on a summer’s day, when we hit the water our 
experience of swiftly moving through the air is preserved in our awareness 
but is “no longer.” What is recognised by Bergson’s suggestion is quite 
simple, notwithstanding the apparently paradoxical formulation of a 
“continuation of what no longer exists into what does exist.” 
The idea of a continuation of what no longer is into what exists is arguably 
absent from the modified form of the memory theory as discussed above, 
on which what memory explains is only the preservation of past moments. 
And it seems to allow decisively singling out a role for memory in change 
perception. Beyond preservation of successive terms, the experientially 
appealing idea of a perception of what is “no longer,” in the present, is 
the key.21
Now, the immediate response to this idea could well be that it seems to 
bring us within the remit of the critique applied to the traditional version 
of the memory theory, based on the idea captured in Broad’s (1923) and 
Russell’s (1927) remarks. The criticism would apply if what we would be 
describing was an experience that is of the past, in the same sense that 
episodic memories are. This would mean that when we experience the 
note B in the succession of notes G-D-B within the specious present, for 
example, the G would be “no longer” in the same sense that hearing the 
G 30 seconds or 5 hours ago would be “no longer.” Watching a shooting 
star would involve phases which are “no longer” in the same sense that 
the moon has moved involves past experiences which are “no longer.” We 
would not then be able to account for a distinction between noticing that 
change happened and perceiving change immediately, which is the important 
insight expressed by Broad. This would indeed be a bad result.
This, however, is not what the version of the memory theory which involves 
recognising “the continuation of what no longer exists into what does exist” 
21. Dainton’s point concerning the relation of memory to durée noted above — that it 
is “simply the unifying relation which connects the earlier and later phases into a single 
episode of durée” (Dainton 2017, 104, fn. 15) - does not, then, fully capture the scope 
of Bergson’s position.
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implies. The key, I think, is that the “continuation” we’re invited to notice is 
not of an object or content as past (e.g., in the past experiences of the moon’s 
location), but rather what might be called the becoming present of the past. To 
put it in terms of tense, we’re invited to consider not a tensed experience, 
but an experience which can be put in terms of “dynamic tensing” — of 
the moments becoming present, becoming past, continuously. This experience 
of “tensing” in the scope of the present, absent from the account presented 
by James and Phillips, indicates the manner in which a primary form of 
memory (distinct from episodic, or “personal,” memory) is constitutive of 
the non-inferential experience of change. The experience is tensed when it 
is no longer within the scope of the specious present, but while it is, it is 
dynamically experienced as being preserved while becoming past.
Bergson’s ideas on memory and temporal perception allow us, then, to 
articulate what might be called a “dynamic memory theory.” The view can 
be considered as a version of the modified memory theory, insofar as the 
role attributed to memory as partially constitutive of change perception, 
prolonging the “before into the after” (Bergson 1965, 44), is essentially 
the same as that described by Phillips. The dynamic view, as with Phillips’ 
construal of the modified account, avoids the objection which was seen to 
be deadly for the traditional memory theory. The modified theory as such, 
however, is meant to be compatible with views (e.g., Lee 2014) that deny 
any role for tense in non-inferential temporal experience. As I’ve suggested 
above, Phillips’ articulation of the theory does not in itself provide a 
conclusive motivation for the appeal to memory. The motivation, I’ve 
claimed in this section, can be provided in the context of the dynamic 
view, differentiated from other possible versions of the modified theory by 
the way it accommodates the phenomenon of “dynamic tensing” within 
the scope of non-inferential change perception.22 
IV. Conclusion
I have argued that Bergson’s view is in agreement with insights expressed as 
early as William James’ work and more recently in publications by Phillips, 
concerning the involvement of a form of primary memory in temporal 
experience. I have also suggested that Bergson’s construal of the memory 
22. The dynamic memory theory I’m describing has interesting similarities with Husserl’s 
“modal retentionalism,” on which successive phases are presented under different temporal 
modes — i.e., as receding more and more into the past — but a comparison between the 
views lies beyond the present scope.
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theory might allow to address a challenge arising with regards to a recent 
formulation of the account. 
There might be reason to worry, however, that the memory theory 
of temporal experience lies in tension with an additional theoretical 
commitment taken up in Bergson’s work. As I noted above, Phillips’ 
argument in favour of the memory theory is meant to apply to both 
the retentional and extensional models. And Bergson’s position on the 
experience of time is arguably a version of the latter — on his proposal, 
temporal experience itself unfolds in time just like its content.23 Now, 
the problem here concerns the fact that the contribution of memory in 
(immediate) experience seems to rely on a notion of simultaneous presence 
with a precept or sensation. Taking memory of phases, a change (e.g., 
the opening notes G-D of Bach’s suite) to be partially constitutive of the 
experience of change appears to amount to the view that the remembered 
contents are simultaneous with the successive phases (e.g., the B note 
which succeeds them). The result would be pulling apart the content (the 
succession G-D-B) from the time it takes the experience to occur, since the 
temporal content allegedly results from the simultaneous conjunction of a 
precept (e.g., the note B) and the memory of preceding phases (e.g., notes 
G-D). The conjunction might itself have some temporal extension (e.g., 
of experiencing the B note), but this extension does not conform to the 
extension of the experienced content (e.g., of the phrase G-D-B).
This issue merits further discussion, but one way to approach this concern 
is to consider the memory constitutive of the immediate experience of 
change apart from the notion of simultaneous presence. Primary memory, a 
memory “within change itself,” might not rely on the kind of simultaneous 
conjunction with present precepts which characterises the availability of 
secondary, or episodic, memory. It can be taken to be implicated in the 
“distention,” or “stretching out” of the perceived present, characteristic of 
experience itself and not merely its objects.
23. See Dainton (2017). In recent and forthcoming work (Wolf 2020), I discuss Bergson’s 
relation to the view.
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Abstract: This paper examines Bergson’s position concerning the relation between 
memory and the immediate experience of change. I argue that Bergson’s view, which has 
not been discussed in significant detail in the literature, can shed new light upon recent 
debates on the topic. I approach this in three steps. First, I examine the “memory theory” 
of immediate temporal experience in its two main forms — a “traditional” version and 
a “modified” account — situating Bergson’s views vis-à-vis this distinction. Second, I 
explore a contemporary defence of the memory theory and underline a limitation in this 
account. Finally, I focus on a feature of Bergson’s reflections on memory and temporal 
experience that can potentially address this limitation.
Keywords: Henri Bergson, temporal experience, primary memory, William James, Thomas 
Reid.
Résumé : Cet article examine la position de Bergson concernant la relation entre la 
mémoire et l’expérience immédiate du changement. Je soutiens que le point de vue de 
Bergson, qui n’a pas été discuté en détail dans la littérature, peut apporter un nouvel 
éclairage au débat récent sur le sujet. J’aborde cette question en trois étapes. Premièrement, 
j’examine la “théorie de la mémoire” de l’expérience temporelle immédiate sous ses deux 
formes principales — une version “traditionnelle” et un compte “modifié” — en situant 
le point de vue de Bergson par rapport à cette distinction. Ensuite, j’explore une défense 
contemporaine de la théorie de la mémoire et je souligne une limitation de ce compte-
rendu. Enfin, je me concentre sur une caractéristique des réflexions de Bergson sur la 
mémoire et l’expérience temporelle qui peut potentiellement résoudre cette limitation.
Mots-clés : Henri Bergson, expérience temporelle, mémoire primaire, William James, 
Thomas Reid.

